Conflict of Laws - Validity of Nevada Divorces by C., E. P.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 6 | Number 2
Symposium Issue: The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1943-1944 Term
May 1945
Conflict of Laws - Validity of Nevada Divorces
E. P. C.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
E. P. C., Conflict of Laws - Validity of Nevada Divorces, 6 La. L. Rev. (1945)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol6/iss2/13
Notes
CONFLICT OF LAWS-VALIDITY OF NEVADA DivORcES-Petition-
ers were indicted for bigamous cohabitation, in violation of the
laws of North Carolina. For many years, the petitioners and
their respective spouses had lived in North Carolina. On May 7,
1940, they went to Las Vegas, Nevada. Six weeks later each filed
suit for divorce in Nevada on grounds recognized in that state.
Service was by publication and both were granted uncontested
divorces. On the same day they were married in Nevada and
returned to North Carolina where they lived together. The trial.
court convicted them of bigamous cohabitation, refusing to rec-
ognize the Nevada divorces. The North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, relying upon the celebrated case of Had-
dock v. Haddock.1 The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari, overruled the Haddock decision, reversed the judgment
of the North Carolina court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.2
Upon a reconsideration of the case the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, in turn, remanded the case to the trial court for
the taking of evidence on the question of whether the petitioners
had acquired a bona fide domicile in Nevada. The jury found that
such a domicile had not been acquired. The trial court therefore
held that the Nevada court had no jurisdiction to grant divorces
to the petitioners, who were again convicted. The North Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the North Carolina court's decision. (Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, C. C. H., 5 U. S. Sup. Ct. Bull. 1495-
May 21, 1945.)
The two Williams cases are the latest development in a very
confused area of the law. A state court has jurisdiction to grant
a divorce decree if it has jurisdiction of the subject matter., In
the final analysis jurisdiction over the marriage status turns upon
the question of domicile. If both parties are domiciled within the
state the court has jurisdiction.' If neither party is domiciled
1. 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867 (1906).
2. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 817 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L.
Ed. 279 (1942), noted in (1943) 5 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 319.
3. For a comprehensive discussion see Rodman, Bases of Divorce Juris-
diction (1945) 39 Ill. L. Rev. 343.
4. Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317, 25 S. Ct. 679, 49 L. Ed. 1066 (1905).
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within the state the court does not have jurisdiction." The con-
flict arises when only one of the parties is domiciled within the
state. The problem is intensified when, as in the instant case, the
full faith and credit clause is invoked in order to compel a state
to give effect to divorce decrees of sister states whose divorce
laws are much more liberal than those of the forum.
Forty years ago the United States Supreme Court rendered
the Haddock decision. This case was of far reaching importance
and gave rise to much discussion and criticism.6 It involved a
suit for separation and alimony brought by the wife in New
York. The husband pleaded in defense a divorce decree obtained
by him in Connecticut where he had established a separate domi-
cile. Service on the wife had been obtained by publication and
she had not entered a personal appearance. The court held that
New York, the matrimonial domicile where the wife still resided,
need not give full faith and credit to the Connecticut decree since
it had been obtained by the husband who had wrongfully left
his wife at the matrimonial domicile.
In the Haddock case, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed, but distinguished its earlier holdings in Cheever v. Wil-
son7 and Atherton v. Atherton.' In the Cheever v. Wilson one
spouse was domiciled in the state where the divorce was granted
and the court had personal jurisdiction over the other. The de-
cree was entitled to full faith and credit. In Atherton v. Atherton
the state of matrimonial domicile granted the divorce with con-
structive service upon the other spouse. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter was based upon the fact that the state granting
the divorce was the matrimonial domicile. In the Haddock case
the court granting the divorce was the separate domicile of the
husband who had deserted his wife. This was not sufficient to
impart jurisdiction to dissolve the marital status. Jurisdiction
over the other spouse, or over the marriage relation, which was
5. Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551, 45 L. Ed. 804 (1901); Streltwolf
v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179, 21 S. Ct. 553, 45 L. Ed. 807 (1901); Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366 (1903).
6. Among these are Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Di-
vorce (1906) 19 Harv. L. Rev. 586; Bingham, The American Law Institute
vs. the Supreme Court-In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock (1936) 21
Corn. L. Q. 393; Holt, Any More Light on Haddock v. Haddock? (1941) 39
Mich. L. Rev. 689; Lewis, Divorce and the Federal Constitution (1915) 49
Am. L. Rev. 852; McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction
(1928) 37 Yale L. J. 564; Rodman, Recognition of Divorce Decrees (1939) 12
Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 16; Strahorn, A Rationale of the Haddock Case (1938)
32 Ill. L. Rev. 796; Vreeland, Mr. and Mrs. Haddock (1934) 20 A.B.A.J. 568.
7. 76 U. S. 108, 19 Law Ed. 604 (1870).
8. 181 U. S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794 (1901).
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deemed to rest at the matrimonial domicile, was essential. Thus
where the parties live separately the element of fault becomes
a jurisdictional factor which may be inquired into by other states.
The doctrine is well established that the full faith and credit
clause does not preclude an investigation of jurisdictional facts.9
The rule of the Haddock decision, good or bad, was the law
for forty years and was incorporated into the Conflict of Laws
Restatement.' Some of the writers who had strongly criticised
the case in the beginning were becoming reconciled to its hold-
ing."' Then in the first Williams decision, the case of Haddock v.
Haddock was expressly overruled.12 The jurisdiction requirement,
where the state of the divorce was the domicile of the complaint
only, was freed from the somewhat confusing refinements con-
cerning "matrimonial domicile." Mr.. Justice Douglas, speaking
for the court, declared, "we see no reason, and none has been
advanced, for making the existence of state power depend on an
inquiry as to where the fault in each domestic dispute lies."'
In so ruling the court upheld the rule of Fauntleroy v. Lum"
that an otherwise valid judgement, rendered by the court of an-
other state which had complete jurisdiction, is entitled to full
faith and credit regardless of the public policy of the state of the
forum.
In holding that the Nevada divorce was entitled to full faith
and credit in North Carolina the court was careful to leave open
the question as to whether the Nevada decree would be entitled
to full faith and credit if the North Carolina court had found
contrary to the Nevada holding that there was no bona fide
domicile in Nevada. That was precisely the question with which
the court was confronted in the second Williams case. After
pointing out that under our system of law judicial power to grant
a divorce is based on domicile, the supreme court concluded
that one state's finding of domicile is not binding on another
state. "In short, the decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication
of everything except the jurisdictional fact."' 5 The court recog-
9. Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U. S. 457 (1873); Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S.
555, 19 S. Ct. 506, 43 L. Ed. 808 (1899). See Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Di-
vorce (1936) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 749; Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter
and Res Judicata (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 386.
10. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) 113 (a) (1i).
11. Beale, Haddock Revisited (1929) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417.
12. 317 U. S. 287, 304, 63 S. Ct. 207, 216, 87 L. Ed. 279, 289 (1942).
-13. 317 U. S. 287, 301, 63 S. Ct. 207, 214, 87 L. Ed. 279, 287.
14. 210 U. S. 230, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039 (1908).




nized the two opposing factors: a state's right to safeguard its
interest in the family relations of its people, and the power of
another state to grant divorces to litigants appearing in its courts.
The necessary adjustment of these opposing interests could be
left to neither state. Though the United States Supreme Court
does not set itself up as a "court of probate and divorce," it is
open to all claims that full faith and credit has not been ac-
corded a divorce decree of a sister state. The court makes this
clear in its statement, "The challenged judgment must, however,
satisfy our scrutiny that the reciprocal duty of respect owed by
the States to one another's adjudications has been fairly dis-
charged, and has not been evaded under the guise of finding an
absence of domicil and therefore a want of power in the court
rendering the judgment."1"
In the instant controversy, North Carolina's finding that peti-
tioners had never abandoned their domicile in that state appeared
to be favored by the court. 7 In the first Williams case, in discuss-
ing the .social effects of the Haddock decision, the court quoted
with approval from Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Haddock v.
Haddock.,8 The text of the discussion was that if decrees of a
state altering the marital status of its domiciliaries are not valid
throughout the nation a rule would be fostered which could not
help but bring "considerable disaster to innocent persons" and
bastardize children who had heretofore been considered as the
offspring of lawful marriage. In the second Williams case, how-
ever, the court concluded that statistics do not justify the lurid
foreboding that parents will disregard the'fate of their offspring
or be unmindful of the status of dignity to which they are en-
titled.19 There have always been strong dissents in the cases
which attempt to solve the problem of tangled marital status.
The Haddock case and the first Williams case-have been criticised.
No doubt the second Williams case will bring forth voices of pro-
test. Perhaps Mr. Justice Frankfurter is right in saying of the
problems before the court, "they arose before and after the de-
cision in the Haddock case . . . and will, I daresay, continue to
rise no matter what we do today .... Neither the crudest nor the
subtlest juggling of legal concepts could enable us to bring forth
a uniform national law of marriage and divorce.
2 0
16. Id. at 1500.
17. Id. at 1503.
18. 201 U. S. 562, 628, 26 S. Ct. 525, 551, 50 L. Ed. 867, 894 (1906).
19. Williams v. North Carolina, C. C. H., 5 U. S. Sup. Ct. Bull. 1495, 1503.
290, 17 U. P. 287, Q4, 63 S. Ct. 207, 216, 87 L. Ed. 279, 289 (1942).
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The Louisiana courts have usually recognized the divorce
decrees of sister states on the grounds of comity.21 The Haddock
decision did not foreclose such recognition. Voorhies v. Voorhies22
and Aarnes v. Aarnes28 involved "Reno" divorces. In both cases
the burden was on the person attacking the foreign decree to
prove there was no bona fide residence. The intent to reside per-
manently in Reno was found by the court in both cases. Appar-
ently the decisions in the Williams cases will not preclude Lou-
isiana from following the rule applied in the above cases.
One may safely generalize that, for the time being at least,
a state in which one of the spouses is domiciled is empowered to
issue a valid divorce decree. Such decree will be entitled to full
faith and credit in all states. The question of domicile will de-
pend upon intent to reside permanently in the state that issues
the divorce. The plaintiff's fault in leaving the matrimonial
domicile will have no effect upon the validity of the decree.2 4 Thus
the only time a state court can refuse full faith and credit to a
divorce decree of another state is upon a finding that there was
no bona fide domicile of either spouse in the other state. Since
the state which issued the divorce naturally found a bona fide
domicile, the refusal of another state to recognize the divorce is
subject to review by the United States Supreme Court.
E.P.C.
CRIMINAL LAW-ASSAULT WITH AN UNLOADED FIREARm-The
defendant, a member of the New Orleans police force, had been
engaged in an argument and fight with a soldier. While in an
intoxicated condition and in pursuit of his adversary, defendant
entered the residence of a third person, pointed his unloaded
revolver at the occupants and pulled the trigger several times
simultaneously demanding, "Where is my man? Tell me where
he is or I will kill you." The defendant was forthwith charged
with and convicted of aggravated assault. In affirming his con-
viction the supreme court took the position most favorable to
21. Aarnes v. Aarnes, 162 La. 648, 135 So. 13 (1931); Voorhies v. Voorhies,
184 La. 406, 166 So. 121 (1936). See Comment (1939) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 96.
22. 184 La. 406, 166 So. 121 (1936).
23. 172 La. 648, 135 So. 13 (1931).
24. "In view of Williams v. North CaroZina, the jurisdictional require-
ment of domicil is freed from confusing refinements about 'matrimonial
domicil.' " C. C. H., 5 U. S. Sup. Ct. Bull. 1495, 1497 (May 21, 1945). Apparently
Haddock v. Haddock is not reinstated by the second Williams Cse,
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